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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/904,744	07/13/2001	Emilio Barbera-Guillem	B-73	3980

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EXAMINER

SISSON, BRADLEY L

ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER

1634

DATE MAILED: 10/23/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<p align="center"><b>Office Action Summary</b></p>	<b>Application No.</b> 09/904,744	<b>Applicant(s)</b> BARBERA-GUILLEM ET AL.	
	<b>Examiner</b> Bradley L. Sisson	<b>Art Unit</b> 1634	

**-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☐ Responsive to communication(s) filed on \_\_\_\_.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**.                      2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-16 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-16 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- 11) ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_ is: a) ☐ approved b) ☐ disapproved by the Examiner.
- If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
- 12) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120**

- 13) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_.
  3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).
- a) ☐ The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
- 15) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

**Attachment(s)**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)                             | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). ____.  |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                    | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152) |
| 3) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) ____. | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____                                    |

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Location of Application***

1. The location of the subject application has changed. The subject application is now located in Workgroup 1630, Art Unit 1634, and has been docketed to Primary Examiner Bradley L. Sisson.

### ***Specification***

2. The title of the invention is not descriptive. A new title is required that is clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed.
3. The disclosure is objected to because of the following informalities: The specification has been found to contain references to US Patent Applications. The specification does not reflect the current status of said applications.

Appropriate correction is required.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

4. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that

the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Attention is directed to the decision of *Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar* 19 USPQ2d 1111 (CAFC, 1991):

This court in *Wilder* (and the CCPA before it) clearly recognized, and we hereby reaffirm, that 35 USC 112, first paragraph, requires a “written description of the invention” which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The purpose of the “written description” requirement is broader than to merely explain how to “make and use”; the “applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the “written description” inquiry, *whatever is now claimed*.

5. For convenience, claim 1, the sole independent claim under consideration on the merits, is reproduced below.

1. A functionalized nanocrystal comprising a plurality of polynucleotide strands of predetermined sequence wherein a terminal portion of each of the plurality of polynucleotide strands is operably linked to the functionalized nanocrystal, and wherein the opposite terminus of each of the plurality polynucleotide strand is unbound to the functionalized nanocrystal and extends outwardly from the functionalized nanocrystal.

6. It is noted with particularity that the claims are drawn to a product, not a method of making said product. Accordingly, the specification must reasonably suggest that applicant possessed the entire genus of polynucleotides at the time of filing. A review of the specification fails to find an adequate written description of any one, much less a plurality of polynucleotide strands, whether or not they are “operably linked” or a “functionalized nanocrystal.” The

specification teaches that the polynucleotides are to be used in detection methods, however, the specification does not teach with sufficient detail how one is to link any number of polynucleotides to a solid support, where said polynucleotides can be of virtually any nucleotide sequence (length and composition) and of virtually any density on said nanocrystal. Such non-disclosure does not reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the invention at the time of filing. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision of *Fiers v. Sugano* 25 USPQ2d 1604-5 (CAFC, January 1993) wherein is stated:

We also reject *Fiers* argument that the existence of a workable method for preparing a DNA establishes conception of that material. Our statement in *Amgen* that conception may occur, *inter alia*, when one is able to define a chemical by its method of preparation requires that the DNA be claimed by its method of preparation. We recognize that, in addition to being claimable by structure or physical properties, a chemical material can be claimed by means of a process. A product-by-process claim normally is an after-the-fact definition, used after one has obtained a material by a particular process. Before reduction to practice, conception only of a process for making a substance, without a conception of a structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute conception of the substance claimed as a process. Conception of a substance claimed *per se* without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties. . .

\* \* \* \*

The difficulty that would arise if we were to hold that a conception occurs when one has only an idea of a compound, defining it by its hoped-for function, is that would-be inventors would file patent applications before they had made their inventions and before they could describe them. That is not consistent with the statute or the policy behind the statute, which is to promote disclosure of inventions.

Attention is also directed to the decision of *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (CA FC, July 1997) 43 USPQ2d 1398 wherein is stated:

In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulas usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate written description of the claimed genus. In claims to genetic material, however, a generic statement such as "vertebrate insulin cDNA" or "mammalian cDNA," without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function. It does not specifically define any of the genes that fall within its

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definition. It does not define any structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members of the genus. A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what it achieves as a result. Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369, 372-373 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate."). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material.

Thus, as we have previously held, a cDNA is not defined or described by the mere name "cDNA," even if accompanied by the name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 USPQ2d at 1606.

Attention is also directed to the decision in *In re Shokal*, 113 USPQ 283 (CCPA 1957) wherein is stated:

It appears to be well settled that a single species can rarely, if ever, afford sufficient support for a generic claim. *In re Soll*, 25 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1309, 97 F.2d 623, 38 USPQ 189; *In re Wahlforss et al.*, 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 867, 117 F.2d 270, 48 USPQ 397. The decisions do not however fix any definite number of species which will establish completion of a generic invention and it seems evident therefrom that such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of particular cases. Thus, in the case of small genus such as the halogens, consisting of four species, a reduction to practice of three, or perhaps even two, might serve to complete the generic invention, while in the case of a genus comprising hundreds of species, a considerably larger number of reductions to practice would probably be necessary.

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We are of the opinion that a genus containing such a large number of species cannot properly be identified by the mere recitation or reduction to practice of four or five of them. As was pointed out by the examiner, four species might be held to support a genus, if such genus is disclosed in clear language; but where those species must be relied on not only to illustrate the genus but to define what it is, the situation is otherwise.

As noted above, however, the instant disclosure has not been found to provide an adequate written description of a single nanocrystal that has a plurality of polynucleotide strands operably linked to a functionalized nanocrystal.

7. It appears that applicant is attempting to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 USC 112, first paragraph, through obviousness. Obviousness, however, cannot be relied upon for satisfaction of the written description requirement. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43 USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

8. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-16 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, as it relates to written description requirement.

Claims 1-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. As set forth in *Enzo Biochem Inc., v. Calgene, Inc.* (CAFC, 1999) 52 USPQ2d at 1135, bridging to 1136:

To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' "*Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513

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(Fed. Cir. 1993)). Whether claims are sufficiently enabled by a disclosure in a specification is determined as of the date that the patent application was first filed, see *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).... We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a "reasonable" amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must not be "undue." See, e.g., *Wands*, 858 F.2d at 736-37, 8 USPQ2d at 1404 ("Enablement is not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation . . . However, experimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation. The key word is 'undue,' not 'experimentation.' ") (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In *In re Wands*, we set forth a number of factors which a court may consider in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation. These factors were set forth as follows: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. *Id.* at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. We have also noted that all of the factors need not be reviewed when determining whether a disclosure is enabling. See *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the *Wands* factors "are illustrative, not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.").

Claims 1-16 have been interpreted as encompassing virtually any number of polynucleotides of virtually any length, and that these polynucleotides can be used in virtually any nucleic acid assay for any purpose.

9. As noted above, the specification does not reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. Given that one cannot enable the use of that which they do not yet possess, applicant cannot enable the use of the "functionalized nanocrystals."

10. A review of the disclosure finds five examples.

1. Example 1, pages 25-29, illustrates "the production of exemplary, basic fluorescent nanocrystals appropriate for functionalization according to the present invention.



2. Example 2, pages 29-32, illustrates “a preferred embodiment of exemplary functionalized nanocrystals.
3. Example 3, pages 32-37, illustrates “additional embodiments comprising functionalized nanocrystals comprising a plurality of nucleotide strands.” As seen therein, four nucleotides strands are used (SEQ ID NO:1, 2, 3, and 4), which are comprised primarily of A, T, G, and C, respectively.
4. Example 4, pages 37-45, “illustrates various embodiments of using functionalized nanocrystals comprising a plurality of polynucleotide strands extending therefrom in a method of detection of a target molecule using the signal generation and signal amplification afforded by the dendrimer formation according to the present invention.” The example is prophetic and is void of specific starting materials and reaction conditions.
5. Example 5, pages 45-51, illustrates “embodiments of the method of using functionalized nanocrystals comprising a plurality of polynucleotide strands according to the present invention for signal generation and signal amplification for detecting the presence or absence of a target molecule.” Like Example 4, *supra*, the example is void of specific starting materials and reaction conditions.
6. The situation at hand is analogous to that in *Genentech v. Novo Nordisk A/S* 42 USPQ2d 1001. As set forth in the decision of the Court:

“ ‘[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.’ *In re Wright* 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *see also Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharms. Co.*, 927 F. 2d 1200, 1212, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1026 (Fed Cir. 1991); *In re Fisher*, 427 F. 2d 833, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970) (‘[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.’).

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“Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable. *See Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148 USPQ 689, 696 (1966) (starting, in context of the utility requirement, that ‘a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’) Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure. While every aspect of a generic claim certainly need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified in the specification, reasonable detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the invention.

“It is true . . . that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art. *See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skill in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point, a direction for further research. (Emphasis added)

7. The specification is silent as to how the skilled artisan is to overcome art-recognized problems. Zhang et al., *Bioinformatics*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2003, page 14, states:

It is widely recognized that the hybridization process is prone to errors and that the future of DNA sequencing by hybridization is predicated on the ability to successfully cope with such errors. However, the occurrence of hybridization errors results in the computational difficulty of the reconstruction of DNA sequencing by hybridization. The reconstruction problem of DNA sequencing by hybridization with errors is a strongly NP-hard problem. So far the problem has not been solved well.

8. Chan (US Patent Application Publication US 2002/0119455 A1):

[0018] In practice, Probe Up methods have been used to generate sequences of about 100 base pairs. Imperfect hybridization has led to difficulties in generating adequate sequence. Error in hybridization is amplified many times. A 1% error rate reduces the

maximum length that can be sequenced by at least 10%. Thus if 1% of 65,536 oligonucleotides gave false positive hybridization signals when hybridizing to a 200-mer DNA target, 75% of the scored "hybridizations" would be false (Bains, 1997). Sequence determination would be impossible in such an instance. The conclusion is that hybridization must be extremely effective in order to generate reasonable data. Furthermore, sequencing by hybridization also encounters problems when there are repeats in sequences that are one base less than the length of the probe. When such sequences are present, multiple possible sequences are compatible with the hybridization data. (Emphasis added.)

9. As set forth in Carrico, (US Patent 5,200,313) the extent and specificity of hybridization is affected by the following principal conditions:

1. The purity of the nucleic acid preparation.
2. Base compositions of the probe - G-C base pairs will exhibit greater thermal stability than A-T or A-U base pairs. Thus, hybridizations involving higher G-C content will be stable at higher temperatures.
3. Length of homologous base sequences- any short sequence of bases (e.g., less than 6 bases), has a high degree of probability of being present in many nucleic acids. Thus, little or no specificity can be attained in hybridizations involving such short sequences. From a practical standpoint, a homologous probe sequence will often be between 300 and 1000 nucleotides.
4. Ionic strength- the rate of reannealing increases as the ionic strength of the incubation solution increases. Thermal stability of hybrids also increases.
5. Incubation temperature- Optimal reannealing occurs at a temperature about 25 - 30 °C below the melting temperature for a given duplex. Incubation at temperatures significantly below the optimum allows less related base sequences to hybridize.

6. Nucleic acid concentration and incubation time- Normally, to drive the reaction towards hybridization, one of the hybridizable sample nucleic acid or probe nucleic acid will be present in excess, usually 100 fold excess or greater.

7. Denaturing reagents- the presence of hydrogen bond-disrupting agents, such as formaldehyde and urea, increases the stringency of hybridization.

8. Incubation- the longer the incubation time, the more complete will be the hybridization.

9. Volume exclusion agents- the presence of these agents, as exemplified by dextran and dextran sulfate, are thought to increase the effective concentrations of the hybridizing elements thereby increasing the rate of resulting hybridizations.

Further, subjecting the resultant hybridization product to repeated washes or rinses in heated solutions will remove non-hybridized probe. The use of solutions of decreasing ionic strength, and increasing temperature, e.g., 0.1X SSC for 30 minutes at 65 °C, will, with increasing effectiveness, remove non-fully complementary hybridization products.

10. In view of the breadth of scope claimed, the limited guidance provided, the unpredictable nature of the art to which the claimed invention is directed, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the claims are deemed non-enabled by the disclosure.

11. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

12. Claims 1-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.
13. Claims 1-16 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of a "nanocrystal."
14. Claim 5 is confusing as to whether it is a product or a method claim. Such confusion arises as a result of the phrase "is used to."

#### ***Double Patenting***

15. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

16. Claims 1-16 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-8 of U.S. Patent No. 6,261,779 B1. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because he kit comprises the functionalized nanocrystal claimed instantly.


***Conclusion***

17. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (703) 308-3978.

The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

18. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gary Benzion can be reached on (703) 308-1119. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (703) 872-9306.

19. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.



Bradley L. Sisson  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1634

BLS